- By Revan Tranter
- Visiting
Scholar,
- U.C. Berkeley, and ABAG Executive
Director 1973-1995
Two great bridges. Thousands of service men and
women and shipyard workers. A handful of major corporations. All played a part
in creating the conditions for an association of the Bay Area’s local
governments to flourish—or at least take its first steps.
Ferries across the Bay were plentiful in the 1920s and
1930s. But it was the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge and the Golden Gate
Bridge, built in the depths of the Great Depression, that both captured the
imagination and served as symbols of a newer community than people had been
familiar with in their own localities—a Bay Area community.
A few years later, after the horrors and triumphs of World
War II, the area found itself growing at a record pace. Shipyard workers,
many from the south, liked what they saw and stayed. GIs and other service
people who had shipped out from Oakland to fight in the grim struggle against
Japan also liked what they saw. Of those lucky enough to return alive and
healthy, many got married, moved here and started families.
Toward the end of the war, industry leaders, worried about
the region’s ability to adapt easily from a defense-related to a peacetime
economy, formed the Bay Area Council in 1945. They began to be concerned
that increased smog from burgeoning traffic might discourage businesses from
locating here. Linkages gradually became apparent, and the council
started to become interested in transportation and then land-use planning. In
1955 what is today called the Bay Area Air Quality Management District was
formed (following the Regional Water Quality Control Board in 1949), and in
1957 (after eight years’ study by the Legislature) the Bay Area Rapid
Transit District.
But in that year, the Bay Area Council made a move that had
unintended consequences. It resurrected a 1946 proposal for a regional
agency to acquire, manage and operate the Bay Area’s major airports,
seaports and bridges. In Sacramento, a Senate Interim Committee on Bay Area
Problems had been formed, and after a visit to study what is now called the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, endorsed the Bay Area Council’s
proposal the following year. The council launched a substantial public
relations campaign to gain support for what was to be called the Golden Gate
Authority, and sponsored a bill in the Legislature, though it was not
successful.
What all this did, of course, was to alarm Bay Area local
governments. Berkeley City Manager John Phillips did extensive research on the
subject in 1958, and his Mayor Claude B. Hutchison, was urged by the Alameda
County Mayors’ Conference to convene a meeting of Bay Area Mayors.
Mayor Jean Fassler of Pacifica in San Mateo County assisted by calling a
follow-up meeting and before long there was a bandwagon of city opposition to
any metropolitan authority not controlled by local government.
In 1960, with advice from Berkeley Councilmember (and U.C.B.
planning professor) Jack Kent and assistance from Phillips and San Leandro City
Manager Wes McClure, as well as the League of California Cities (LCC), an
alternative proposal was drafted…for a voluntary metropolitan council of
cities (to which counties were shortly added). By the summer of that year
proposed bylaws had been drafted by Richard Carpenter, the League’s
Executive Director and General Counsel, and Bill MacDougall, General Manager of
what is now called the California State Association of Counties (CSAC). The
proposed body was now ready to accept its first members.
The term “metropolitan council”—borrowed from
discussions in other areas of the country—had been used provisionally, but
the counties disliked it, feeling it too “big-citified.” While
shaving one morning, Mayor Hutchison hit on an alternative—which is why
the new organization became the Association of Bay Area Governments.
The Early Years
To
get it going, a majority of both cities and counties was required, who would
all execute the joint powers agreement drawn up under the provisions of Title
1, Division 7, Chapter 5 of the Government Code of California. By January 12,
1961, city and county majorities had been attained, and the first meeting of
ABAG’s General Assembly was held the following month, electing Mayor
Hutchison to be the first President. Although a few years behind similar
efforts in Detroit (1954), Salem, Oregon and Washington, D.C. (both 1957),
ABAG became the first council of local governments in California. While
each city and county was to have one vote in the twice-a-year General Assembly,
the counties had insisted that it be bi-cameral, with a majority of counties
secure against being outvoted, even by all the cities combined. Of course the
reverse applied too, but would have less dramatic impact than if, say, three
counties out of five present could outvote 60 or 70 cities. The Executive
Board—or Committee as it was then called— was to meet at least four
times a year (in practice it was much more frequent, in fact monthly for many
years), and its seats were allocated on a roughly population basis. The annual
dues were to be divided equally between counties and cities.
The new association’s headquarters were in the
Claremont Hotel, legally in Oakland but postally in Berkeley. The main reason,
apart from a fairly central Bay Area location, was that the hotel already
housed the Institute for Local Self-Government (a joint LCC-CSAC venture) and
the League’s office. By May 1, Wilber E. Smith, former City Manager of San
Rafael, had left his position as Assistant Director of the National League of
Cities to become ABAG’s first Executive Director.
In its first decade—once it had discarded the somewhat
naïve idea of relying on contributed assistance for its planning
work—ABAG did quite an impressive job of producing an open space
plan, an ocean coastline plan, and an Airport systems plan.
But three things occurred that attracted public attention and
affected ABAG adversely for years to come.
First was the creation, on
an interim basis in 1965, but made permanent four years later, of the San
Francisco Bay Conversation and Development Commission (BCDC). Local
governments had argued that responsibility for protecting the Bay should reside
with those communities adjacent to it, and ABAG felt that it could execute that
role in a responsible manner. But the prevailing opinion in the Legislature was
that it was local government that had allowed the shocking deterioration of
this once pristine resource to happen. So here was yet another single-purpose
district, and ABAG’s pride was soothed only to the extent that it would be
allowed to appoint all four of the city representatives on the Commission
(counties appointed one each , with a majority of members from gubernatorial,
legislative and federal sources).
The second incident was the discovery, in 1968, that Tom
Truax, the young Assistant to Executive Director Warren Schmid (Smith had left
four years earlier to become Assistant to the President of the National
Automotive Safety Foundation in Washingtton, D.C.) had systematically, with
great determination and remarkable skill, embezzled approximately
half-a-million dollars: perhaps $ 2 1/2 million in today’s money. Although
ABAG was far from a wealthy organization, large sums did pass through its
hands, since it was acting as a legal conduit for BART to obtain federal
planning funds.
The story, much too long to tell here, is dramatic and
tragic, with a four-year prison term for Truax, the ruin of a capable Executive
Director’s career, and an end to both ABAG’s vain hope of taking
responsibility for the Bay, and its quite reasonable expectation of receiving
the new federal designation as the Bay Area’s regional transportation
planning agency.
Indeed the third event—following, as we have seen,
BCDC’s grant of permanent status—was the Legislature’s 1970
creation (to take effect in 1972) of yet another single-purpose agency,
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (and its subsequent designation by
the U.S. Department of Transportation to receive substantial annual funds).
After the Truax incident, ABAG had to concentrate on staying
alive, and retaining its membership. A great deal of dedicated work by several
of its leaders - including Thomas Mellon (San Francisco’s Chief
Administrative Officer), Supervisor Joseph Bort of Alameda County (who
was an attorney), and newly-hired Legal Counsel (and former Berkeley
councilmember Arthur Harris)—eventually resulted in recovery of almost all
the money.
The next few years saw a somewhat chastened
organization. Schmid had been succeeded by Novato’s City Manager, J.
Julien (known as John) Baget, whose somewhat “green eyeshade”
personality seemed to fit the new circumstances. On the positive
side, financial integrity was re-established, and the excellent
professional planning work of the sixties was confirmed in 1970, with approval
and publication of the Regional Plan: 1970-1990, with its emphasis on
city-centered growth. Less worthy of praise was a timid approach to
controversial proposals, such as that for another bridge (the “southern
crossing”), over the Bay and transportation links in San Francisco.
Senator John Foran of San Francisco, author of the MTC
legislation, would have preferred to see a truly comprehensive agency. He
made sure his bill included a proviso for MTC’s automatic absorption in
any such future agency. It was perhaps in that spirit, led by Supervisor Bort,
its first chair, that MTC decided to rely on ABAG for the general land-use
planning which the federal authorities required as the basis for regional
transportation planning.
ABAG’s leaders, especially Supervisor Bort and Mayor
Don Dillon of Fremont, who became President in 1972, believed the time was now
approaching for a return to a more expansive outlook and a willingness to
undertake greater responsibilities. A national search was conducted to
find a successor to Baget, who left for southern California in the spring
of 1973.
To his successor, there seemed three possibilities:
• to achieve, and become part of, the more comprehensive type of
regional planning established in most of the country’s metropolitan
areas;
• to give more protection to the Regional Plan by increased
attention to the reviews of local proposals for federal funds; and
•
to seek responsibility for managing the Bay Area’s role under section 208
of the new federal Water Pollution Control Act.
Comprehensive Planning and Regional
Governance
The notion of a more inclusive form of regional
governance, or at least regional planning, had been around for many
years—championed by groups ranging from the Commonwealth Club and the Bay
Area Council to the League of Women Voters and the Sierra Club, and latterly
by two members of the State Assembly: Republican William Bagley of Marin
County, and Democrat John Knox of Richmond. Others have written
extensively about this, but space limitations make that impossible here.
Jack Knox is the legislator most closely associated with
attempts to achieve a strong and capable regional planning agency, but although
his various bills always succeeded in the Assembly, they never did in the
Senate. Two principal reasons were the fear of conservatives from
southern California that this idea might spread to their part of the state and
somehow result in domination by Los Angeles of their suburban territory; and
the unwillingness of Bay Area groups to compromise on the composition of
a governing board (local government appointees, directly elected
representatives, or a mixture of both).
Knox himself was a compromiser, as were ABAG and the Bay
Area Council. But the Sierra Club and the statewide Planning and Conservation
League would not budge from their complete distrust of local government
appointees, and that made just enough of a difference to one or two
Senators. At one point, success lay only two votes short, and could have
been achieved, but for Knox’s bad luck in having, for a floor manager in
the other house, to rely on Senator Milton Marks of San Francisco, not
the most adept (or determined) at that role, and famous for reflecting the
opinion of the last person he’d talked to.
By 1976 it was all over, and the subject did not return
until creation of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission in 1989—chaired by
former U.C. Berkeley Chancellor Michael Heyman—whose report and subsequent
legislation two years later also failed to achieve enough support in the State
Senate. There are those who strongly believe that, had the Bay Area
gained a truly comprehensive regional planning capability a generation ago, and
had such an agency been gradually strengthened by the Legislature, as MTC has
been, we would today have fewer “urban sprawl” problems, and a
notably better means to cope with our future.
Protecting the Regional
Plan
Under the previous year’s Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act, ABAG had in 1967 received a key designation to
review local and regional applications for a vast array of federal grants and
loans (airports, health facilities, highways, housing, libraries, open space,
waste treatment, etc.). Although not a right to veto, these A-95 reviews (named
after the OMB circular establishing the procedures) were intended to be
influential in giving federal funding agencies a better idea of regional
priorities, and making neighboring jurisdictions aware of potential impacts
from local proposals.
That they were taken seriously not just by the funding
agencies, but by the applicants, was shown by ABAG’s decision to charge
non-members a fee, based on a percentage of the grant applied for, not to
exceed 110% of what their ABAG dues would have been. In the wake of the
Truax troubles, this proved to be a valuable tool in maintaining
membership.
The professional quality of the reviews, even in ABAG’s
lean years of the late sixties and early seventies, was high.
Occasionally reporters or researchers would compare applications submitted with
those recommended, and conclude that voluntary councils of
governments like ABAG lacked the will to differ from or argue with any of their
members. What such people were unaware of was the many conversations at
staff level, in which a project might be modified substantially before being
officially submitted.
In 1974, concerned about the potential adverse effects on
the Regional Plan from major projects such as a large shopping center or
housing development, ABAG established an early-warning, review panel
system to consider potential threats to the Regional Plan. Such matters could
be raised before the Regional Planning Committee (RPC), whose chair would
appoint a three-person hearing panel to advise whether a full-scale
review should be undertaken. Any RPC review would result in a final
decision by the Executive Board.
In 1975, on a matter raised by the city of Livermore, the
Board faced its most contentious issue—a major developer’s proposal
for a “new town” in Alameda County, adjacent to Livermore, to be
called Las Positas. After a tense debate, the Board, by a 23-2
vote, agreed with the RPC that the proposal was premature, and as designed
would have major adverse effects on local schools, air quality, and ground
water.
This may well be the most emotional meeting ABAG’s
Executive Board has ever had. Differing sharply from his Alameda County
colleague Joe Bort, Supervisor Fred Cooper - good friend of ABAG, chair
of its Finance Committee and supporter of strong regional governance, as well
as housing for low- and moderate-income families—stormed out of the
meeting after being on the losing end, saying he would do his best to make sure
the county withdrew from ABAG. Some fancy footwork was necessitated the
next day, and Alameda County did not withdraw.
What probably made as much
difference as any in the Planning Committee’s and Executive Board’s
decision was the quality of the professional staff work. It was superb,
earned the support of other key regional agencies such as MTC and the Air
District (and indeed Alameda County itself, which turned down the project), and
gained for ABAG’s major projects review system a good deal of praise and
several awards.
It was unfortunate that within a few years this capacity lay
dormant, victim of both Proposition 13 and massive cutbacks in federal
dollars. True, the A-95 system continued, but after 1980 it was relegated
by the federal government to a less significant role, and diminished still
further by a severe reduction in the number of grant programs.
Section 208 and the Environmental
Management Plan
The Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 included an innovative approach to the problem of non-point source
pollution, such as that from urban runoff or agricultural wastes (as opposed to
that from a point source, such as a pipe). Congressional intent indicated
a preference for regional planning agencies to take responsibility for finding
solutions. The Environmental Protection Agency was to cooperate with state
water quality agencies, who would designate appropriate regional
agencies.
ABAG made a very strong push for designation, ousting in the
process the Bay Area Sewage Services Agency (whose track record was shown to be
so pitiful that its original sponsor, Assemblyman Jack Knox, did what few
legislators would normally do, agreed it had been a mistake, and got it
eliminated). In 1975, the State Water Resources Control Board designated ABAG
to take on the 208 responsibilities, and soon afterwards EPA awarded the
Association a massive $4.3 million grant to carry out the work needed. A
far-sighted EPA Region IX Administrator, Paul DeFalco allowed and encouraged
ABAG to merge the project with the work it was already obliged to
undertake under the Clean Air Act. EPA and the State ultimately approved
a complex work program combining air and water quality, water supply, and solid
waste - in other words, to create an Environmental Management Plan for the Bay
Area.
The work necessitated not just a larger technical staff, but
to guide it in a manner likely to achieve the broadest public and political
support, an 46-person Environmental Management Task Force, organized into
several subcommittees and assisted by several advisory groups. Many interests
were represented, including those of environmentalists, developers,
agriculture, local government, minorities, and so on. Led by indefatigable
Supervisor (and now U.S. Senator) Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco—who
was also caring for her terminally ill husband—the whole group worked very
hard to derive from many conflicting opinions a result that would have broad
community support.
The Bay Area—like so many of the country’s large
urban regions—was a very long way from attaining the air quality standards
mandated by federal and state law. It became clear early on that the most
difficult part of the plan in which to reconcile competing interests would be
the Air Quality element. But few had imagined the vehemence with which some
groups and individuals would confront the topic.
When the first draft
emerged in 1977, the news media, who had ignored all encouragement and
paid little attention to the work of the Task Force, focused only on
controversial words. For example, the mere mention, among many scores of (often
only theoretically) possible actions, of emission control devices on
power lawnmowers, brought a massive headline: “ABAG Threatens Lawnmower
Ban.” Nightly TV news followed suit, and the public got the
impression that, out of nowhere had suddenly emerged a vast
lifestyle-threatening conspiracy. As the San Jose Mercury News commented,
“In California, lifestyles are sacred.”
No doubt this atmosphere is what encouraged the building
industry to attack with such fury the compact-growth recommendations, such as
increasing density around BART stations, expanding infill development, reducing
development of steep slopes, and so on - including temporary moratoria where
necessary. The areawide campaign was extemely well organized by a new
group, based in Contra Costa County - COLAB (Coalition of Labor and
Business). The sight of as many as 150 hardhats glowering at them, as
well as allegations of a future that would bring here the density of Tokyo,
proved unnerving to many local elected officials, and a strong likelihood
developed that the EMP would fail to be adopted.
Knowing he had close ties to industry and labor, ABAG’s
Executive Director asked Jack Maltester, former Mayor of San Leandro and the
Association’s President in 1969, to meet as soon as possible with him and
the current President (Councilmember Len Grote of Pleasant Hill) and Vice
President (Santa Clara County Supervisor Rod Diridon). To a neutral hotel
room at the Claremont, Maltester brought COLAB’s attorney, and a
compromise was forged whereby, in return for ABAG’s dropping the land-use
provisions from the EMP, COLAB would switch from vehement opposition to
strong support, and request Senator John Nejedly of Contra Costa County to
change his anti-ABAG bill to one in which the state was prohibited from
interfering with ABAG’s adopted EMP.
The result was adoption of the EMP by the General
Assembly, and passage of Nejedly’s bill, after which ABAG fought literally
day and night against the strongest urging by Governor Edmund G. Brown
Jr.’s top advisers that he not sign it. To the surprise of many he did, in
an airport lounge on the evening of the last possible day. The Bay Area’s
Environmental Management Plan would always have to meet federal
requirements and standards, but if it did so the state could not unilaterally
make changes, and if it didn’t, ABAG and its members would have the first
opportunity to modify it.
Although the necessary compromises meant
that the EMP was a long way from achieving perfection, it received national
awards, and was described by EPA’s Regional Administrator as “the
most sophisticated plan in the country.” The national government had
taken a thoughtful approach to reducing pollution on a regional basis. Where it
subsequently fell down was in not following up with adequate implementation
funding for the many agencies who would be involved in carrying out the
plan. Across the board, the times of generous funding were
beginning to come to an end.
Hard
Times
The late seventies and early eighties
were a time of financial stringency for California’s local governments and
for ABAG in particular. Proposition 13 was approved by the voters in
1978, with almost immediate harsh effects. The other large councils of
governments in California were less affected, because they received relatively
generous federal funds for transportation planning. MTC’s support of
ABAG’s regional planning work through federal DOT and state gas-tax funds
was appreciated and needed, but they were much less than if ABAG itself had
been directly funded.
When Prop. 13 passed, ABAG had to act quickly. For
many jurisdictions, even in reduced circumstances, the annual dues to ABAG were
small enough not to be a serious item in budget revisions. But for the
larger counties and cities, they might equal the salary of one or more nurses
or police officers. San Francisco, as both city and county, paid the
highest dues, and an off-the-cuff decision was made that they would probably be
willing to pay 40 percent, and pretty certainly thirty. To be safe, and
to set an example, a 70 percent dues reduction was agreed to by the Finance
Committee and Executive Board, following a staff recommendation. One
third of ABAG’s staff was laid off, and those remaining took a
voluntary cut in pay.
Given not only Prop. 13 and the completion of the EMP grant,
but also the winding down of ABAG’s large annual 701 planning grant from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the next few years were
difficult. But the agency’s work seemed for the most part to be
appreciated or at least respected. Except for an occasional very
temporary withdrawal, no jurisdiction dropped out. Sometimes,
though, meeting even the reduced payroll was a scary affair, and on
occasion MTC made all the difference, by advancing the funds for work
ABAG performed under the two agencies’ contract.
Perhaps the oddest thing, for anyone today looking back at
decisions made then, is that, at a dreadful time in the agency’s finances,
ABAG took the risk of moving from rented offices in the Claremont Hotel and,
jointly with BART and MTC, building its own headquarters opposite the Lake
Merritt station. The decision was made at the strong urging of Supervisor
Joe Bort, after whom the MetroCenter building was later named. True, the
deal had certain advantages, because BART wanted extra space, was going to
build on an adjacent parking lot anyway, and made the land available
without cost. But ABAG compounded its risk (though not without a great
deal of thought) by taking twice as much space as it needed, and renting half
to BART, in three staged amounts. Years later, BART’s General
Manager confided to ABAG’s Executive Director that he and his colleagues
had been astonished when ABAG gave notice, in the appropriate three stages,
that it wanted the space back. “To be honest,” he said,
“we thought you were going to go under.”
A New Emphasis
What
probably helped restore a measure of financial security, and even persuade most
of the few remaining non-members to join, was the decision to make up for the
reduction in planning capacity by becoming more of a service
agency.
Since as far back as the early seventies, ABAG’s
distinguished work in seismic safety research and planning has had a service
orientation; and one could look at the Association’s pioneering work in
emergency medical services, beginning the system of emergency response now
firmly rooted in each county, as a form of service.
But what really caught on, no doubt because of the direct
linkage to dollar savings, were two programs - financial services; and
insurance and risk management.
• In 1983, ABAG launched its first financial services
program: credit pooling. The idea was borrowed from a group of Sonoma
County cities who had banded together to borrow money collectively, saving a
tidy sum on issuance costs. Surely ABAG could provide a more convenient
vehicle, because no separate joint powers body was needed (ABAG already was
one), and with roughly a hundred jurisdictions (let alone many more if the
program could be marketed outside the Bay Area) there would always be at least
a few cities or counties contemplating capital funding. The initial $4
million issuance enabled four cities to purchase items ranging from vehicles to
buildings to communications systems.
Today borrowers include not only cities and counties,
but special districts, hospitals, universities, schools, nonprofit
housing and health care organizations, housing partnerships, and private
businesses. More than $1 billion dollars has been provided in tax-exempt
financing. Visit the University of California’s handsome systemwide
headquarters in downtown Oakland and you are looking at a building financed by
ABAG. Seven different programs are offered on a statewide basis,
and the savings to members have been immense.
• In 1986, ABAG’s Pooled Liability Assurance
Network (PLAN) got off the ground. It was formed because the insurance
industry, notorious for premium peaks and valleys, was dropping local
government clients left and right. To ABAG, despite lacking knowledge of
the field, it seemed a worthwhile challenge to get up to speed and try to form
a kind of member-owned cooperative. After a good deal of research and
discussion with legal, financial and insurance experts, as well as with member
governments, ABAG PLAN began operation. Today, it provides comprehensive,
general and auto liability coverage for bodily injury, property damage,
personal injury, and public officials’ errors & omissions. It manages
both risk and claims, and specialises in training. Since its inception, ABAG
PLAN has returned over $20 million to its members in annual rebates, while
increasing both coverage and the pool’s financial stability.
• In 1987 came the Workers’ Compensation
Program—again, something offered without much prior knwledge, but with the
firm intention to save ABAG members money. Today, there are a
Workers’ Comp. Administration Program for employers who self-insure, and a
Workers’ Comp. Pool for those too small to do so. Training and
claims management are prominent features of the programs.
• Since 1994, when it began abagOnline, ABAG has
provided public agencies with Web hosting, access to and assistance with the
Internet, and training.
• Since the seventies ABAG has offered training to
employees of member governments. With the promotion of Eugene Y. Leong to be
the Association’s Executive Director in 1995, the Training Center has
successfully concentrated on environmental programs such as hazardous materials
and waste treatment—and today does so for the general public, using,
among other tools, online registration and instruction. OSHA
certification can be achieved, as well as continuing education credits.
• In 1995, the foundation for ABAG POWER was laid,
leading to a natural gas purchasing pool the following year, and an
electricity purchasing pool in 1997. As with earlier service
programs, the preliminary work required was immense, because in so many
innovative areas there are no real experts and too many self-proclaimed
ones. Moreover, power supply, even before California’s
post-deregulation crisis, is an area characterized by frequent changes in
federal and state laws and regulations. But already savings have been achieved,
and may well increase in the future.
Regional Planning Today
Mention of various successful service programs that have kept ABAG buoyant
as a voluntary member organization should not imply that its planning programs
have been abandoned. True, the planning staff, in the absence of the
generous federal funding of the seventies, is much smaller. However,
certain programs are synonymous with ABAG, e.g., the demographic research
studies which underpin the well-known bi-annual Projections series and are
relied on by many public and private groups— including MTC for it own
planning work; state-mandated fair share housing needs distribution; and
earthquake preparedness maps and studies. Key work also encompasses hazardous
waste allocation and the Bay Area Delta Estuary.
But pride of place in bringing this short history to its
conclusion now goes to two other planning approaches:
• In 1987, former state Senator (and now Attorney
General) Bill Lockyer of Alameda County, conceived the idea of a hiking and
biking trail that would one day circle the perimeter of San Francisco and San
Pablo Bays - for maybe 400 miles: a “Ring around the Bay.” He
was inclined to ask MTC to take on the responsibility for planning it and
managing its construction, but (with MTC’s agreement) ABAG asked to take
on that role, and Lockyer acquiesced. His legislation passed, and in the years
since, and with the assistance of a devoted band of volunteers organized
through a non-profit corporation, ABAG has supervised the completion, so far,
of about half the Bay trail.
There is now strong support for the trail, both in the
Legislature and the Governor’s office, evidenced by the allocation in 1999
of $2.5 million and last year of triple that amount. ABAG should be
immensely proud to play the lead role in establishing what will be a permanent
jewel in the Bay Area’s crown.
• 1987 was also the year in which Gary Binger
came from the Community Development Director’s position in Walnut Creek to
become Regional Planning Director at ABAG. He has recently left to direct
the Urban Land Institute’s California Smart Growth Initiative, but should
be remembered for the leadership role he played in the following three
initiatives.
– Sub-Regional Planning: Given on the one
hand a political climate that does not favor top-down regional planning,
and on the other a widely-held perception that parochial planning is not wanted
either, it has been possible, with the patient cooperation of many local
elected officials and staff, as well as private groups, to piece together
agreements for more sensitive development of various sub-regions within
the Bay Area. Examples are the Tri-Valley cities and the county of Alameda, the
cities and county of Sonoma, Oakland and San Leandro, the San Mateo County
coastside communities, Napa County and its southern cities, and the cities and
county of Solano.
– Inter-Regional Partnership: The gradual
convergence of the Bay Area and the Central Valley, witnessed by all too many
early-morning, long-distance commuters, has brought about the Inter-Regional
Partnership, of three councils of governments, five counties, and ten
cities. The goal is to achieve a more equitable jobs/housing balance,
improve transportation and air quality, establish more sustainable methods of
moving people between their homes and distant jobs, and pursue inter-regional
economic development opportunities.
– Smart Growth: ABAG has joined with the
Air District, BCDC, MTC, the Regional Water Quality Control Board and the
Alliance for Sustainable Development, in an intensive , two-year outreach and
participation process. The intent—through maps indicating which areas
could be available for different kinds of development, and which
environmentally important areas could be preserved or enhanced—is to try
for a regional consensus on a preferred so-called “Regional Livability
Footprint” for the next 20 years. ABAG’s Executive Board would
consider adopting a formal alternative forecast for MTC’s Regional
Transportation Plan and other regional plans. Implementation actions and
incentives that local and regional agencies might use to implement targeted
land use changes would also be chosen, ideally leading to a “smart growth
strategy” for the Bay Area.
Conclusion
Thus ends
our concise history of ABAG. Except that more history lies in the
future—if this picture is accurate of a large, diffuse group of people who
in a very imperfect world, have managed to enjoy the good, surmount the bad,
learn from both, move with the times, and help to make this unique area
something better than it otherwise would be.